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Abstract:  Professional sports franchises have used the lure of economic riches as an incentive 
for cities to construct new stadiums and arenas at considerable public expense. An analysis of 
taxable sales in Florida cities demonstrates that none of the 6 new franchises or 8 new stadiums 
and arenas in the state since 1980 have resulted in a statistically significant increase in taxable 
sales in the host metropolitan area. In addition, using the numerous work stoppages in 
professional sports as test cases, again no statistically significant effect on taxable sales is found 
from the sudden absence of professional sports due to strikes and lockouts. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: L83 
 
Keywords: sports, strikes, economic impact, baseball, football, basketball, hockey, stadiums 
                                                           
HRobert A. Baade, Department of Economics and Business, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 
60045, 847-735-5136 (phone), 847-735-6193 (fax), baade@lfc.edu 
HHRobert W. Baumann, Department of Economics, Box 192A, College of the Holy Cross, 
Worcester, MA 01610-2395, 508-793-3879 (phone), 508-793-3708 (fax), 
rbaumann@holycross.edu 
HHHVictor A. Matheson, Department of Economics, Box 157A, College of the Holy Cross, 




  Spectator sports are big business.  The “Big Four” professional leagues in the U.S. and 
Canada – Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National 
Hockey League (NHL), and the National Basketball Association (NBA) – attract over 120 
million fans to games each year, with television viewing audiences many times this number. Of 
particular interest to economists is the sports facility building boom that has occurred in the past 
twenty years. Since 1987, 78 major league stadiums and arenas have been constructed at a cost 
of $22.6 billion (in 2005 dollars), of which $16.0 billion was financed with public funds (Baade 
and Matheson, 2006). 
  Many attempts have been made to quantify the economic impact of a professional 
franchise on a host city. Interest groups attempting to develop public backing for a publicly 
financed stadium or arena frequently commission economic impact studies that report large 
contributions from professional sports teams to local economies.  For example, the Oregon 
Baseball Campaign, a group dedicated to bringing MLB to Portland, reported that “a MLB team 
and ballpark would generate between $170 and $300 million annually in gross expenditures to 
the state of Oregon” (Oregon Baseball Campaign, 2002) while a similar analysis completed for 
the Virginia Baseball Authority stated that a “a major league baseball franchise and stadium in 
northern Virginia would pump more that $8.6 billion into the economy over 30 years,” or $287 
million annually. The St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association estimated that the 
Cardinals brought $301 million in annual economic benefits to the region with another potential 
$40 to $48 million in benefits from a post-season appearance (St. Louis Regional Chamber and 
Growth Association, 2000). Of course, baseball is not the only sport to provide rosy economic 
impact numbers. A study of the NFL’s New Orleans Saints estimated the impact of the team on  4
the state at $402 million in 2002 (Ryan, 2002), and the Seattle Seahawks of the NBA claimed 
that they pump $234 million into the area’s economy annually (Feit, 2006). 
  Public finance economists, on the other hand, are in nearly unanimous agreement that the 
figures produced by sports boosters are wildly inflated. Many studies, including Rosentraub 
(1994), Baade (1996), Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), and Coates and Humphreys (1999) to 
name just a few, have examined the economic impact of stadium construction. Without 
exception, these studies have found that new stadiums provide little or no net economic stimulus 
to the communities in which they are located.  Others such as Porter (1999), Baade and 
Matheson (2001), Coates and Humphreys (2002), and Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2005a) 
have examined sports “mega-events” such as the Super Bowl, World Series, and All-Star Games.  
Again, these researchers find that boosters’ estimates of the economic impact of large sporting 
events exaggerate the true economic impact of these events by up to a factor of ten. 
  Labor disputes serve as a natural experiment for determining the economic impact of 
professional sports on host communities. If franchises do indeed provide large positive impacts 
on local economies then their sudden absence due to work stoppages should result in observable 
corresponding negative effects on the city. Several previous studies examine the impact of sports 
on their local metropolitan areas using strikes and lockouts as test cases. Zipp (1996) examines 
the effect of the 1994 MLB strike on 17 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), and he later 
extends his work to cover the effect of this strike on spring training venues in Florida (Zipp, 
1997). Baade and Matheson (2005) examine the 1981 and 1994/95 MLB baseball strikes using 
personal income data to arrive at an average net annual economic impact of a MLB team on a 
host city of between $16.2 million and $132.3 million, or somewhere between one-twentieth and 
one-half of the typical figures suggested by baseball’s boosters. Coates and Humphreys (2001)  5
present the most comprehensive analysis of the economic consequences of sports strikes and 
lockouts. Their analysis of real per capita personal income finds no statistically significant 
effects from the strikes in MLB in 1972, 1981, and 1994, and strikes in the NFL in 1982 and 
1987. 
  The existing studies of sports labor interruptions have two major weaknesses. First, all 
four previous studies examined the 1994/95 baseball strike, but only Coates and Humphreys 
(2001) examine a sport other than baseball. To the best of our knowledge, no other study has 
examined the effect of labor stoppages in the NBA and NHL.  
Second, a major difficulty of measuring the economic impact of sports teams is that even 
the impact of large businesses may be hard to isolate within the large, diverse metropolitan 
economies in which they reside. For example, even if a MLB franchise does result in a $300 
million boost to the host city, this is less than 0.1 percent of the annual personal income of a 
large metropolitan area like Los Angeles. Any income gains as a result of a franchise would 
likely be obscured by normal fluctuations in the region’s economy. This is problem is further 
compounded if the labor interruption lasts for only few months or less. Even if the effects of a 
labor dispute are large in the time period immediately surrounding the strike, this impact is likely 
to be obscured if annual data is used to estimate the effect. Coates and Humphreys (2001) and 
Baade and Matheson (2005), two studies that examine the ex post economic impact of labor 
interruptions in sports, both suffer from this limitation. For example, Coates and Humphreys 
(2001) attempt to ascertain the impact of the 1972 MLB strike, which lasted only 13 days, using 
annual per capita income data. Using annual data, it is unlikely that even careful analysis of such 
a brief labor dispute will yield useful results. 
  6
The Data  
In lieu of annual income or per capita income data, this paper uses taxable sales data, 
which are available monthly, to estimate the economic impact of sports labor interruptions on 
local economies. These data include just over 25 years of monthly sales tax data (January 1980 
through June 2005) for every county in Florida. Florida is an ideal candidate for this analysis 
since two of its cities have teams from each of the “Big Four” American professional sports. In 
addition, each of the major labor interruptions since 1982, the 1982 and 1987 NFL strikes, the 
NHL’s 1994/95 lockout and 2004/05 strike, the 1998/99 NBA lockout, and the 1994/95 MLB 
strike, has impacted at least one franchise in Florida. Only two other labor interruptions in the 
Big Four have resulted in the loss of games, and this paper does not analyze the 1972 and 1981 
MLB strikes because Major League Baseball did not expand into Florida until Miami gained a 
team in 1993.  
  In order to maximize the chance that the economic effects of the events can be isolated, 
i.e., to minimize statistical “noise,” it is crucial to find data as specific to the area in which the 
mega-events occurred and with the highest frequency possible. Florida provides monthly data on 
taxable sales for individual counties, and these data meet our criteria. In the analysis, taxable 
sales from several counties are added together corresponding to the three specific Florida 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that will be examined: Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm 
Beach, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Orlando.  
  Since the current gross domestic products of large MSAs in Florida such as Miami or 
Tampa exceed $50 billion in nominal terms, even the effects of a potential major economic event 
such as a strike can be obscured by the normal economic fluctuations of these large, diverse 
economies. Many factors including the local, regional and national business cycle, state and  7
federal government policies, monetary policy and inflation, international factors, consumer and 
business confidence, wealth effects, and a host of other ingredients tend to influence taxable 
sales. In order to prevent these other factors from clouding the true effects of the labor 
interruption, it is essential to find a method to account for them.  
  One method for filtering much of the “noise” is to analyze the change in taxable sales in 
the MSA as a percent of the taxable sales in the rest of Florida. Since it is reasonable to assume 
that many of these exogenous factors will affect the economies of the individual counties and the 
state in a similar way, this method serves to account for the economic impact of all the variables 
that the county and state have in common. The MSA/state ratio, therefore, is influenced only by 
economic events that are unique to one area or the other. While a strike may affect areas 
peripheral to the MSA in which the team regularly plays, the vast majority of the economic 
activity occurs within the neighborhood of the relevant sports venue. Therefore, a strike, if 
significant, should affect the MSA/state taxable sales ratio during the time period immediately 
around the strike.   
 
The Model 
  In order to examine the impact of the individual sporting events on taxable sales in the 
relevant MSAs of Florida, we use intervention analysis on an ARIMA model as outlined in Box 
and Tiao (1975). Others have employed similar techniques to analyze a wide array of questions 
in sports economics ranging from the effects of the most recent players’ strikes on Major League 
Baseball attendance (Schmidt and Berri, 2002; Matheson, 2006) to the effects of mega-sporting 
events on taxable sales in host cities (Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2005a). Intervention  8
analysis provides a formal test for the change in the mean of a series as a result of an exogenous 
shock at a specific point in time.  
  The general intervention ARIMA(P,D,Q) model for the taxable sales ratio is  
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where yt
* is the first-differenced taxable sales ratio in time period t, P is the number of lagged 
values of yt
* in the model known as the autoregressive (AR) dimension of the model, εt is an 
error term, Q is the number of lagged values of the error term representing the moving average 
(MA) dimension of the model, and zt is an independent variables representing a variety of sports 
variables and other exogenous economic events such as a natural disaster. D is the number of 
times yt is differenced to create yt
*. The model also includes a vector, Sm, of monthly dummy 
variables to account for seasonal variation in taxable sales. The coefficients for these seasonal 
variables are not included in the regression results in Tables 1-3 but are available from the 
authors upon request. 
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on the taxable sales ratio for all four MSA time series 
indicate that the original data series follow non-stationary paths. In all three cases, it is possible 
to reject the existence of a unit root through first differencing of the original data. Therefore we 
set D equal to one in all three ARIMA models. Next, the autoregressive and moving average 
dimensions of the models must be determined through estimation and diagnostic testing using 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The “optimal” numbers of AR and MA components 
differ by MSA and are shown in Tables 1-3.  
  Finally, we include a vector of independent variables, zt. We identify one non-sports 
occurrence that affected the taxable sales ratio for the Miami MSA to improve the fit of the 
model. Hurricane Andrew, which devastated the South Florida economy in 1992, had a dramatic  9
effect on taxable sales in the Miami MSA. Taxable sales initially fell in the area in the wake of 
the storm, then surged as residents rebuilt homes and replaced damaged property, and finally 
returned to their normal levels after about 18 months. This pattern is modeled using three 
intervention variables: an initial penalty during the month of the storm (August 1992), a convex 
“ramp” (above pre-storm levels) that lasted for three months after the storm, and fifteen-month 
linear decline beginning at the peak of the aforementioned ramp. See Baade, Baumann, and 
Matheson (2005b) for details and a sensitivity analysis of this specification.  
  The labor interruption variables in zt include the NBA lock-out from November 1998 
through January 1999, the MLB strike in August and September 1994 and April 1995, the NFL 
strikes in October and November 1982 and October 1987, and the NHL strikes from October 
1994 through January 1995 and October 2004 through April 2005. When strikes carried over into 
the off-seasons of their sports, only the months during which regular season games were lost 
were counted as strike periods. Of course, not every labor interruption occurred at the beginning 
or end of a month. The results in Table 1 designate labor interruption months as those where at 
least half of the games were lost. Alternative specifications were attempted and made little 
difference in the results.  
  We also include controls for franchise expansions, which represent the entry of sports 
franchises in a similar way that labor interruptions represent a temporary exit. The franchise 
variables in zt include the expansion of the NBA into Miami (Heat, November 1988) and 
Orlando (Magic, November 1989), the expansion of the NHL into Miami (Florida Panthers, 
October 1993) and Tampa (Lightning, October 1993), and the expansion of MLB into Miami 
(Florida Marlins, April 1993) and Tampa (Devil Rays, April 1998).    10
Finally, we also include controls for stadium and arena construction. The NFL stadiums 
constructed in Florida during our sample frame are Raymond James Stadium in Tampa 
(September 1998) and Dolphins Stadium (originally Joe Robbie Stadium) near Miami 
(September 1987). In the NHL, we include controls for the BankAtlantic Center in the Miami 
metropolitan area (October 1998), the St. Petersburg Times Arena in Tampa (October 1996), and 
the Tampa Thunderdome (April 1990) which was used by the Tampa Bay Lightning of the NHL 
until the 1996-97 season and subsequently renamed the Tropicana Dome and used for the 
expansion Tampa Bay Devil Rays of MLB. In the NBA, we include controls for the TD 
Waterhouse Centre (originally Orlando Arena, February 1989) and American Airlines Arena in 
Miami (January 2000). There is not a separate control for the Miami Arena, which was 
constructed prior to the 1988 NBA season as the home of the newly expanded Miami Heat, 
because the timing of the expansion and construction is too close to estimate each effect 
separately.  
  If professional sports have a positive impact on a region’s economy, then one should 
expect a consistent pattern of increasing taxable sales following franchise expansions and the 
construction of new stadiums and a pattern of decreasing taxable sales ratios during periods of 
labor disruptions. In fact, none of the 24 coefficients on the sports-related variables was 
statistically significant at even the ten percent level. Furthermore, only 9 of the 13 franchise 
expansions and new stadiums have positive coefficients and only 7 of the 11 labor disruptions 
have negative coefficients, so that the even the signs on the coefficients pointed in the “correct” 
direction in only two-thirds of the examples. All in all, the models suggest that professional 
sports have little effect on tax revenues in host cities.  
  11
Conclusions  
Professional sports leagues, franchises, and civic boosters, have used claims of significant 
economic windfalls as an incentive for host cities to construct new stadiums or arenas at 
considerable public expense. In the past, league and industry-sponsored studies have estimated 
that the presence of a professional sports franchise increases economic activity by hundreds of 
millions of dollars in host cities. Our analysis, using professional sports lockouts and strikes as 
test cases, fails to support these claims. Our detailed regression analysis of taxable sales in 
Florida over the period from 1980 to mid-2005 reveals that none of the labor disruptions in the 
big four professional leagues have been associated with any statistically significant reductions in 
taxable sales and none of the franchise expansions or new stadiums have been associated with 
any statistically significant increases in taxable sales. These results certainly place doubt on 
boosters’ claims of huge economic impacts associated with professional sports teams. Cities 
would be wise to view with caution economic impact estimates provided by sports boosters, who 
have a clear incentive to inflate these estimates. 12
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Table 1: (Sample 1980.1 - 2005.6) Intervention Analysis: Miami 
Dependent variable: yt
* = ∆(taxable sales ratio) 
Variable    coefficient    std. err.    t-statistic 
 
Constant   0.00911
**   0.00330 2.76 
    
Hurricane Andrew –    -0.0244
**        0.0112  -2.17    
initial penalty    
Hurricane Andrew –         0.0589
**          0.0132  4.48   
convex ramp    
Hurricane Andrew –         0.0706
**          0.0118  5.98 
linear decline    
NFL Strike 1982  0.00273    0.00753  0.36
 
         
NFL Strike 1987  -0.00739     0.00740  -1.00 
      
NBA Strike 1998/99  -0.00987     0.00717  -1.38 
      
NHL Strike 1994/95  0.00353      0.00746  0.47 
    
NHL Strike 2004/05  -0.00739     0.00739  -1.00 
    
MLB Strike 1994/95  -0.00319     0.00673  -0.47 
 
Joe Robbie Stadium,  0.01089     0.01004  1.08 
NFL, 9/1987 
BankAtlantic Center,  0.00510     0.01014  0.50 
NHL, 10/1998 
American Airlines Arena, 0.00120     0.00933  0.13 
NBA, 1/2000 
MLB Expansion,  0.01089     0.00958  1.14 
4/1993 
NHL Expansion,  0.00795     0.01006  0.79 
10/1993 
NBA Expansion,  -0.00066     0.00937  -0.07 
11/1988 
AR(1)   -0.651
**     0.0557  -11.70 
    
AR(2)   -0.344
**     0.0556  -6.19 
    
MA(12)   0.177
**     0.0566  3.12 
    
 
log Likelihood  928.0662    16
 
Notes: All taxable sales ratios have been first-differenced.  
 
The coefficients are reported with their associated t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the 
estimated value is equal to zero. 
** and 
* represent statistical significance at the one percent and 
ten percent significance levels respectively.  17
Table 2: (Sample 1980.1 - 2005.6) Intervention Analysis: Tampa  
Dependent variable: yt
* = ∆(taxable sales ratio) 
Variable   coefficient std.  err.    t-statistic 
 
Constant   -0.00178  0.00111  -1.60   
    
NFL Strike 1982  -0.00235  0.00421  -0.56
 
         
NFL Strike 1987  0.00381  0.00879  0.43 
      
NHL Strike 1994/95  0.00014  0.00236  0.06 
      
NHL Strike 2004/05  -0.0020  0.00211  -0.96 
 
Raymond James Stadium, -0.00162  0.00410  -0.40 
NFL, 9/1998     
 
Tropicana Field,  -0.00058  0.00252  -0.23 
MLB/NHL, 3/1990     
 
St. Pete Times Forum,   0.00156  0.00334  0.47 
NHL, 10/1996     
 
MLB Expansion, 4/1998  -0.00672  0.00338  -0.20 
    
NHL Expansion, 10/1993 0.00259  0.00369  0.70 
 
AR(1)   -0.863
** 0.0487  -17.70 
    
AR(2)   -0.675
** 0.0590  -11.44 
    
AR(3)   -0.482
** 0.0717  -6.73 
    
AR(4)   -0.435
** 0.0793  -5.49 
    
AR(5)   -0.208
** 0.0678  -3.08             
 
log Likelihood  1233.633 
 
Notes: All taxable sales ratios have been first-differenced.  
 
The coefficients are reported with their associated t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the 
estimated value is equal to zero. 
** and 
* represent statistical significance at the one percent and 
ten percent significance levels respectively.  18
Table 3: (Sample 1980.1 - 2005.6) intervention analysis: Orlando  
Dependent variable: yt
* = ∆(taxable sales ratio) 
Variable   coefficient std.  err.    t-statistic  
 
Constant   -0.00873
** 0.00183  -4.77 
    
NBA Strike 1998/99  -0.00152  0.00573  -0.27 
 
TD Waterhouse Centre/  0.00258  0.0165  0.16 
Orlando Arena, 2/1989           
NBA Expansion, 11/1989 0.00005  0.0101  0.05 
         
AR(1)   -0.735
** 0.0454  -16.19 
    
AR(2)   -0.620
** 0.0679  -9.13 
    
AR(3)   -0.489
** 0.0807  -6.06 
    
AR(4)   -0.239
** 0.0738  -3.24 
    
AR(5)   -0.191
** 0.0534  -3.58             
 
log Likelihood  1142.873   
 
Notes: All taxable sales ratios have been first-differenced.  
 
The coefficients are reported with their associated t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the 
estimated value is equal to zero. 
** and 
* represent statistical at the one percent and ten percent 
significance levels respectively. 